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Abortion Law: "Unique Problem for Women"t
Or Sex Discrimination?
Twiss Butlertt
The campaign for the Equal Rights Amendment to the United States
Constitution employed a political strategy that excluded women's access to
abortion, along with other basic equality issues, from the orthodox analysis
of why the Equal Rights Amendment was needed and what it was expected to
do. As part of this costly strategy, women's pregnancy rights were located in
a sex-neutral right of privacy. The privacy right has subsequently been used
as a "gotcha" against women's right not only to privacy, but to equality as
well.
1. POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS ON THE ERA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
Some twenty years ago, leading proponents of the Equal Rights
Amendment faced an extraordinary opportunity to redefine constitutional
equality from a man-to-man standard to a human standard. Their goal was
ratification of the amendment. They could choose to pursue ratification as
advocates for women or as politicians. That is, they could create a vision of
how equality would look if it were done right. They could seek through public
discourse to inspire women to claim that vision by using the only right women
have that is recognized by the Constitution-the right to vote, guaranteed by
the Nineteenth Amendment. Or they could, in consultation with lawyers and
legislators, strategize to treat the principle of constitutional equality as any
other piece of negotiable, special interest legislation by stripping out the
toughest parts, agreeing on some trade-offs, and going for what they thought
they could get.
History indicates that ERA proponents chose the second option, making
a strategic decision by accretion' to argue that the ERA would have "nothing
t In a 1974 letter, Yale Law Professor Thomas Emerson described abortion as a "unique problem
for women" that does not raise equal protection issues. See infra text accompanying note 32.
tt Twiss Butler works on the National Action Staff of the National Organization for Women in
Washington, D.C. This article is a close adaptation of her presentation on the Reproductive Rights Panel
of the Conference, Feminism in the 90s: Bridging the Gap Between Theory and Practice. Please address
communications to the author at 223 Princess Street, Alexandria, VA 22314, Tel. (703) 548-0356 or (202)
835-8977.
1. For a discussion of the term "decision by accretion," coined by Carol Weiss, see JANE J.
MANSBRIDGE, WHY WE LOST THE ERA 68 & 264 n.2 (1986). Although I disagree with Mansbridge's view
that ERA proponents should have done more to tailor their interpretation of the amendment to please
"mainstream voters and legislators," id. at 68, I agree that "Ikiey decisions taken by a few actors structured
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to do with" providing a constitutional basis for legal remedies against five
major categories of sex discrimination: 1) barriers to abortion (a subclass of
pregnancy discrimination though not identified as such); 2) discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation; 3) exemption of women from military combat
(and the implied privileges of adulthood and citizenship that non-exemption
confers on men); 4) sex discrimination in insurance (with its invidious view
of women as sickly, excessively long-lived, and financially advantaged by sex
discrimination); and 5) tax support or tax exemptions for single-sex schools.
Pretexts for these five exclusions had an air of expediency and all have
come back to haunt us. Proponents of this strategy argued that pregnancy,
involving a physical characteristic unique to one sex, did not in itself involve
equal protection questions.2 They further argued that abortion was already
addressed by a sex-neutral right to privacy3 (located elsewhere in a
constitution that was not obliged to respond to women unless their right to vote
was being abridged). Because the ERA was said to deal only with
discrimination between the sexes, homosexuals would not be protected from
discrimination except "when laws treat male homosexuals differently from
female homosexuals. "4 Military combat was not absolutely precluded, but
"[w]omen would serve, as men do now, where they are best fit to serve. " '
Insurance, a state-regulated industry, arguably involved no state action and
might therefore be outside ERA jurisdiction. If not, threatened premium
increases for women must be "the price of equality." 6 Single-sex schools
might be granted various forms of public support without involving state
action7 if "evaluated as making a positive contribution to overcoming the
effects of discrimination and promoting sex equality.""
the information available to the rank and file." Id.
2. Barbara A. Brown, Thomas i. Emerson, Gail Falk, & Ann E. Freedman, The Equal Rights
Amendment:A Constitutional Basisfor Equal Rightsfor Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871, 893 (1971) [hereinafter
Brown et al.I.
3. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See infra text at note 34 for Thomas Emerson's explanation
for not mentioning abortion in the Privacy Qualification section of Brown et al., supra note 2, at 900.
4. Sarah E. Burns, 1983 ERA Legislative History Project 36 (Aug. 26, 1983) (on file with National
Organization for Women, Washington, D.C.) [hereinafter 1983 ERA Legislative History Project]; see also
118 CONG. REC. 9331 (1972) (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh).
5. 117 CONG. REC. 35,796 (1971) (statement of Rep. Thomas P. O'Neill); 1983 ERA Legislative
History Project, supra note 4, at 43.
6. ERA proponents generally avoided discussing the validity of sex-divided insurance classifications
and their alleged advantages for women. During House debate, ERA opponents cited automobile insurance
to support the argument that women would be hurt by equality, but ERA advocates did not respond. 117
CONG. REC. 35,790 (1971). Brown et al., supra note 2, at 891 n.45, cite without comment a discussion
of "insurance rates based on statistical differences between men and women" in Developments in the
Law-Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARv. L. REV. 1109,
1172-76 (1971). In the context of state action, however, Brown et al. stress that the ERA could allow
different treatment on account of sex in the private sector. Brown et al., supra note 2, at 906. See also
infra note 15.
7. Brown et al., supra note 2, at 907.
8. 1983 ERA Legislative History Project, supra note 4, at 33. See also Equal Rights Amendment:
Hearings on H.R.J. Res. I Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm.
on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 124 (1983) (statement of Bernice R. Sandier, Association of
American Colleges) [hereinafter House 1983 ERA Hearings).
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By the second ERA run-through in 1983, the earlier excuses were
buttressed by reassurances that state ERAs had been powerless to legitimize
homosexual marriages,9 mandate public funding of abortions,' or do
anything the federal ERA was not expected to do.
From the start, however, these circumventions were intended to expedite
ratification of the ERA by denying or avoiding its most essential and therefore
most controversial implications. The strategy not only failed, but also doomed
advocates to fight from a defensive stance throughout the ERA campaign and
up to the present day, and to do so at great cost not only to the major issues
involved, but at hazard to existing civil rights laws as well. Consider, for
example, the 1977 Hyde Amendment and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act
of 1978.12 The Hyde Amendment denied Medicaid funding of abortions for
poor women. The Pregnancy Discrimination Act excluded abortion coverage
when it amended Title VII to require employers to provide pregnancy benefits
in employee health insurance plans. Or consider the undermining of Title IX
enforcement by continued tax support for men-only military schools and
women-only public high schools, not to mention tax exemptions for women's
private prep schools and colleges. Note as well the divisive touting of the
advantages of sex and race self-segregation that these arrangements promote
in the name of affirmative action. "
With an honest agenda, the ERA campaign could have been a national
experience in feminist consciousness raising. What should have been a strong
affirmative statement of the power of the ERA to guarantee women's right to
equal protection of the law became instead an ignominious game of cat and
mouse when advocates showed reluctance to acknowledge that the ERA would
require fundamental change. Legislators took turns trapping ERA experts in
their own inconsistencies and evasions. Opponents taunted advocates by
asserting that the ERA would actually do what it ought to do, thus forcing
advocates into ever more tortuous denials.' 4 The issues on which women most
9. 1983 ERA Legislative History Project, supra note 4, at 36.
10. See, e.g., the response of Mary Frances Berry, a commissioner testifying on behalf of the U. S.
Commission on Civil Rights, to a question concerning the effect of ERA on the Hyde Amendment, Pub.
L. No. 95-205, 91 Stat. 1460, § 101 (1977): "1 see the issue of abortion as in the Colorado state cases
as something that ERA does not have to be involved in and would not be involved in any decision." House
1983 ERA Hearings, supra note 8, at 53-54.
11. Pub. L. No. 95-205, 91 Stat. 1460, § 101 (1977). The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality
of the Hyde Amendment, ruling that it did not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment
or the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, in Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1978).
13. See, e.g., Alice Digilio, Classrooms of Their Own: Are Single-Sex Schools Better for Girls?,
WASH. POST EDUC. REV., Aug. 6, 1989, at 4; Lawrence Feinberg, Student's Thesis Explores Her Black
Identity: Howard Students Found Proud to Be 'at Home, 'WASH. POST, Sept. 9, 1989, at B 1; Leslie Milk,
Separation in Schools Now Means Sexual Equality Later, ALEXANDRIA J. (Va.), Mar. 14, 1990, at 5; Linda
Wright Moore, When Separate Can Be Beneficial: AIl-Black All-Male Schools Tried, PHILA. DAILY NEWS,
Apr. 12, 1990, at 42; Larry Gordon, Decision To Go Co-ed Prompts Tears at California Women's College,
PHILA. INQUIRER, May 4, 1990, at A3; Letters to the Editor, What's Good Enough for Mills Should Be
Good Enough for VMI, WASH. POST, May 26, 1990, at A27.
14. See, e.g., House 1983 ERA Hearings, supra note 8, at 802-03. When an anti-ERA congressman
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needed to see women standing firm and speaking clearly instead became those
issues most dreaded, most divisive, and most easily exploited to confirm
stereotypes of feminine deviousness.t" As time passed, the forbidden issues
increasingly came to resemble a necklace of albatrosses. 6
The basic principles articulated by the United States Constitution should
be clear enough for citizens to understand directly, but the tricky approach
chosen by ERA advocates discouraged grass roots discussion of what equality
would mean if human needs-women's and men's-rather than men's needs
alone were to set the standard for defining equal protection of the law. Aside
from traditional political organizing, the role of ERA supporters was reduced
by this negative strategy to that of true, if nervous, believers. They were
typecast as cheerleaders at legislative tournaments where expert "pro's" jousted
with expert "anti's" over mysterious last vestiges of sex discrimination17 or
led scavenger hunts for sex discriminatory language in state and federal
statutes."8
asked if the Hyde Amendment denying Medicaid funding for abortion would constitute sex discrimination
under ERA, pro-ERA law professor Ann Freedman replied:
My analysis is that [a court) would not decide the case on the basis of the Equal Rights
Amendment because it is quite clear that the basis of the analysis by the Supreme Court in
regards to Hyde and all matters regarding abortion [is] a privacy standard, and... that although
sex discrimination arguments would be made, have been made under the Fourteenth Amendment
and have been made in any context, the Court would not decide on that basis . . . [Tihat the
Equal Rights Amendment would simply not be a factor... [Ilf the Court chooses to strike [the
Hyde Amendment] down, which it has not done so far, it would do it on the basis of privacy.
If it chooses to uphold it, it would be based on privacy.
Id.
In this context, Catharine MacKinnon observed, concerning the approach of the June 30, 1982 end
of the ERA ratification period, "By spring 1982, there seemed little to lose, even from the truth." Catharine
A. MacKinnon, Introduction to Excerpts from MacKinnon/Schlafly Debate, 1 LAW & INEQ. J. 341 (1983).
15. See, e.g., exchange between Dr. Donna Shalala and Senators Hatch and Metzenbaum on tax status
of single sex schools during hearings before the Senate Judiciary Committee on Sept. 13, 1983. The Impact
of the Equal Rights Amendment: Hearings on S.J. Res. 10 Before the Subcomm on the Constitution of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 133, 137 (1985) [hereinafter Senate
1983 ERA Hearings].
16. Dubbing these issues "the horribles," Phyllis Schlafly observed after the 1983 Senate hearing on
ERA, "In fairness to [Senator] Tsongas, it isn't his fault that he couldn't answer [Senator] Hatch's
questions. No one can guarantee that ERA won't result in abortion-funding, gay rights, drafting women,
unisex insurance, and more power to the Federal Courts-unless amendments are added whichprevent ERA
from doing those horribles." EAGLE FORUM (Wash., D.C.), June 1983 (emphasis in original). Reacting
defensively, ERA supporters used the same term to subvert the dignity of their own goals. Offering a list
of "Things To Do Over Again The Right Way," columnist Ellen Goodman urged, "Be prepared to play
hardball. Anyone who heard Orrin Hatch's opening salvo knows the outline of the renewed parade of
horribles that would follow from the passage of ERA: homosexual marriages, insurance classification, the
end of veterans preference, and tax exemptions for some churches." Ellen Goodman, ERA 's Coming Back
Older.and Wiser, PHU-A. INQUIRER, June 10, 1983, at 25A.
17. See, e.g., Lynda Crawford, NOW President Alleges Sex Bias in Insurance, HARTFORD COURANT,
June 5, 1983, at A28. Referring to discriminatory practices as the "last vestiges" or "final bastion" of sex
discrimination was common usage that trivialized the need for the ERA by falsely implying that most of
the problems it would address no longer existed.
18. See, e.g., U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTs, 95TH CONG., IST SESS., SEX BIAS IN THE U.S. CODE
(1977); MANSBRIDGE, supra note 1, at 138-43. In her discussion of legislative research projects,
Mansbridge argues that experts were inhibited from producing lists of substantive changes because they
"knew how little the ERA would do for women in the short run," and that "[w]ithout such a list, most
activists remained convinced that the ERA would produce major substantive results." Id. at 142.
In the tactful style of women's politics, discrimination against women was
described, but men were not identified as the source and beneficiaries of it.
By default, the fact that women had less money, status, and physical security
than men seemed to prove that women were indeed their own worst enemies.
Women who dared to hold men responsible for sex discrimination were
journalistically dismissed as "strident" or "man-haters" and found that there
is no way to speak softly enough to please those who don't want to hear what
you have to say, even when they profess to be on your side. In electoral
politics, activists applied ERA litmus tests to candidates, counted votes,
scanned the polls, and hunted for non-threatening slogans like "Sex
discrimination hurts everybody." Since no one wanted to be "unreasonable,"
as advocates for change must be in order to be effective, many sex-referenced
distinctions officially accepted as "reasonable" went unchallenged. 9
Arguing the Equal Rights Amendment as if it were a bad case seems
ultimately to have had a chilling effect on serious retrospective analysis.
Substantive strategy gets scant critical attention in published accounts of the
campaign for ratification.2" Situating the ERA campaign in a virtually
sex-neutral world without misogyny or sex-discriminatory pay-offs for men,
historians are disinclined to question accepted wisdom about who opposed the
ERA and why. Focusing closely instead on political tactics, ERA historians
seem either to regard proponents as hapless women who "lost" the ERA by
not doing the wrong things hard enough (the blame the victim theory), or to
assume that the amendment, more symbol than substance, simply "failed" (the
sour grapes theory). No one acknowledges that it was men who defeated the
19. In a 1982 newspaper advertisement, the National Organization for Women detailed facts rebutting
the accepted notion that insurance sex discrimination was a "fair" trade-off that balanced price advantages
for women in life and auto insurance with lower charges for men in health insurance and annuities. ERA
historians nevertheless generally discuss the insurance discrimination issue and NOW's stance on it in
routine political terms without apparent reference to the analysis presented in the advertisement and
subsequent testimony on federal and state legislation, as well as in litigation under the Pennsylvania
Casualty and Surety Rate Regulatory Act. This failure to research the record empowers myths inimical
to equality and conceals the existence of genuinely sex-neutral remedies. See Will the ERA be Sacrificed
for the Insurance Numbers Game?. in the following three newspapers: WALL ST. J., June 2, 1982, at 19;
L.A. TIMES, June 2, 1982, at V4; N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 1982, at 31 (three-quarter page advertisement by
the National Organization for Women). See also Patrick Butler, Twiss Butler, & Laurie L. Williams, Sex
Divided Mileage, Accident, And insurance Cost Data Show That Auto Insurers Overcharge Most Women
(pts. 1 & 2), 6 J. INS. REG. 243, 373 (1988); Patrick Butler, Twiss Butler, & Laurie L. Williams,
Insurance Department 'Catch-22" Shields Auto Insurers From Consumer Challenges, 7 J. INS. REG. 285(1989); Patrick Butler & Twiss Butler, Driver Record: A Political Red Herring That Reveals the Basic Flaw
in Automobile Insurance Pricing, 8 J. INS. REG. 200 (1989).
20. Accounts widely cited and generally favorably reviewed are: MARY FRANcES BERRY, WHY ERA
FAILED (1986); RIGHTS OF PASSAGE: THE PAST AND FUTURE OF THE ERA (Joan Hoff-Wilson ed., 1986);
MANSBRIDGE, supra note 1; DONALD G. MATHEWS & JANE S. DEHART, SEX, GENDER, AND THE POLITICS
OF THE ERA (1990); GILBERT Y. STEINER, CONSTITUTIONAL EQUALITY: THE POLITICAL FORTUNES OF
THE EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT (1985). An exception among the reviews is a criticism of the Mansbridge
book by Catharine MacKinnon, who faults Mansbridge for presenting the failure of the ERA "not as yet
another male victory but as a female defeat. Indeed, both this book and the ERA effort-because they do
not face up to male dominance and therefore cannot face it down-condescend to and blame the victim
while purporting only concern for her welfare." Catharine A. MacKinnon, Unthinking ERA Thinking, 54
U. CHI. L. REV. 759, 763 (1987).
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ERA, redeeming the promise of John Adams: "Depend upon it, We know
better than to repeal our Masculine systems."2 That this pressured women
proponents at all levels to sell out also goes unacknowledged, as does the
apparent pressure on women scholars not to mention it.
To pass an ERA worth passing requires changing the way women think
about equality and their entitlement to it. This is a process that can occur only
through public dialogue freely pursued. The power of a hostile press to frame
issues so as to conceal men's self-interest in maintaining inequality cannot be
overstated. Nevertheless, the only way to advance great issues is to move them
through the fire of controversy.
II. ABORTION LAW AND SEX DISCRIMINATION
It is interesting to consider where the abortion issue might have been today
if ERA advocates had refused to separate abortion from pregnancy and the
conditions under which women become pregnant. Suppose that they had
responded to the accusation that the ERA would mean abortion on demand by
agreeing enthusiastically, adding that the ERA would not only prohibit legal
barriers to abortion and public funding of abortion, but would also protect
women from such other forms of pregnancy discrimination as forced
sterilization of minority women, denial or surcharging of pregnancy coverage
on private medical expense and disability income insurance, punitive treatment
of maternity leave, and suppression of contraceptive information in public
school curricula.
A. Pregnancy as the Ultimate "Gotcha"22
Institutional discrimination has always relied for justification on
"gotchas"-reasons why ending the discrimination would do its victims "more
harm than good." For women, the ultimate gotcha is pregnancy-a condition
impossible to achieve without, as it were, men's input, but one which assigns
virtually the entire physical burden to women.' Thus, pregnancy discrimi-
nation cuts clean, controlling women without penalty to men. Forced
pregnancy and maternity is the central gotcha used by both conservative and
liberal patriarchs to defeat legislation for women's equality by staging mock
21. Letter from John Adams to Abigail Adams (Apr. 14, 1776), in THE FEMINIST PAPERS 11 (Alice
S. Rossi ed., 1974).
22. Parts of this section appeared in Twiss Butler, Abortion and Pornography: The Sexual Liberals'
"Gotcha "Against Women's Equality, in THE SEXUAL LIBERALS AND THE ATTACK ON FEMINISM (Dorchen
Leidholdt & Janice G. Raymond eds., 1990).
23. As expressed by Professor Garrett Hardin in an editorial explaining a scheme for sterilizing
women, but not men, as a population control measure, "Biology makes women responsible." Garrett
Hardin, Parenthood: Right or Privilege?, 169 SCIENCE 427 (1970). But see letter in response which
identified the sex discrimination and showed how men could be made equally responsible and subject to




It is hard for a pregnant woman to look and feel like a person in full
command of her own body and destiny.24 Pregnancy is a physical fact which
precludes privacy. It "shows." What does it show? That a woman is manifestly
not a virgin. Moreover, that she has been invaded by a man and visibly
subjugated and colonized. 25 In traditional terms, she is "in a fix," a
description which underscores her lack of autonomy. There is, they chuckle,
"no such thing as a little bit pregnant."
But abortion provides a way to be only a little bit pregnant and then not
pregnant at all. In Roe v. Wade,26 a way was found to legalize abortion
without acknowledging women's right to autonomy at any stage of pregnancy
decision-making, including the initiation of the pregnancy itself.
B. Privacy, Not Equality
Granting women a right to privacy in pregnancy matters was like granting
women expensive, limited, and easily revokable guest privileges at the
exclusive men's club called the Constitution. In contrast, men's membership
in this club is a birthright, possibly retroactive to conception.
Between the "creation,"27 as he termed it, of the constitutional right to
privacy in Griswold v. Connecticut2" in 1965 and its application to team
decisions about abortion in Roe v. Wade in 1973, Yale Law Professor Thomas
Emerson and his student co-authors pondered privacy's relationship to the
proposed Equal Rights Amendment in a celebrated Yale Law Journal article
in 1971.29 The article criticizes earlier efforts to gain congressional approval
of an ERA for yielding to political pressure and failing to uphold an absolute
standard of equality between the sexes.3" Yet it proceeds to replicate those
earlier failures by allowing the only exceptions to an absolute standard that
would be needed to render the ERA ineffective. These are exceptions for
"compelling social interests, such as the protection of the individual's right of
privacy, and the need to take into account objective physical differences
between the sexes."31
Yet abortion is not mentioned in this article which was intended to guide
the legislative history of the ERA. In a 1974 letter, Emerson explained why:
24. Letter from Twiss Butler to Houston Post columnist Leon Hale, A Few Things Frances Didn't
Tell (Apr. 22, 1976).
25. id.
26. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
27. Diane Osborne, Lawyers in Birth Control Case Honored by NOW, NEW HAVEN REG., Feb. 11,
1985, at 13.
28. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
29. Brown et al., supra note 2, at 900-02.
30. Id. at 886.
31. Id. at 887. In 1983, an additional "affirmative action" exemption was proposed to protect
women-only schools. See supra text accompanying note 8.
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The main reason we did not discuss the abortion problem in the article
was that abortion is a unique problem for women and hence does not
really raise any question of equal protection. Rather the question is one
that is concerned with privacy.32
If abortion is "a unique problem for women," so is pregnancy. Emerson's
standard of equal protection is defined by men's needs. Under that standard,
women would have no protection from discrimination on the basis of
pregnancy, the quintessential form of sex discrimination. Still, Emerson made
clear that more than just police searches were to be protected by an
independent, sex-neutral right of privacy in the Constitution, even though he
admitted that "[t]he position of the right of privacy in the overall constitutional
scheme was not explicitly developed by the Court" in the 1965 Griswold
33decision.
Perhaps it was the reassuring vagueness and elasticity of the new
abortion/privacy constitutional right, "derived from a combination of various
more specific rights embodied in the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth and Ninth
Amendments," 34 that tempted liberal women to hope that. they could get by
stealth what they dared not demand as a fundamental right to be secured by
the ERA. Certainly, liberal men must have been satisfied with the prospect of
having abortion legally available, but isolated from any woman's claim to
bodily integrity or equal protection, and thus thoroughly under men's control.
Then, as now, political supporters of the Equal Rights Amendment could be
counted on to welcome a solution that simply shunted an awkward issue onto
another track. Their instincts could hardly have differed from those of their
predecessors of whom Emerson and his co-authors wrote, "the proponents may
have wisely refused to be too explicit about the laws and institutions the
Amendment would reach."31
Evidently pleased with the versatility of the privacy right he argued in
Griswold,36 Emerson speculated together with his co-authors on the many
ways in which the right of privacy might be applied. The article even implies
the legal basis for privacy's later use in defending pornography: "This
constitutional right of privacy operates to protect the individual against
intrusion by the government upon certain areas of thought or conduct, in the
same way that the First Amendment prohibits official action that abridges
freedom of expression. "3 Moreover, the right of privacy could be developed
to meet new challenges. Although its exact scope conveniently was "not spelled
32. Letter from Thomas 1. Emerson to Cres Apprill (Jan. 15, 1974), in Senate 1983 ERA Hearings,
supra note 15, at 635.
33. Brown et al., supra note 2, at 900.
34. Id. at 900.
35. Id. at 886.
36. See Osborne, supra note 27.
37. Id. at 900.
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out by the Court in the Griswold case," nevertheless "it is clear that one
important part of the right of privacy is to be free from official coercion in
sexual relations. 38
Lastly, concerning "the impact of the young, but fully recognized,
constitutional right of privacy," Emerson and his co-authors said that its scope
"is dependent upon the current mores of the community. Existing attitudes
toward relations between the sexes could change over time-are indeed now
changing-and in that event the impact of the right of privacy would change
too. "39
And so it has. In 1983 Catharine MacKinnon observed that, in Roe v.
Wade, women got a constitutional right to abortion "as a private privilege, not
as a public right."' In 1985, twelve years after Roe v. Wade, Emerson
admitted that it had been difficult to argue for a constitutional right
unmentioned in the Constitution and thought that it was "likely that the right
to have an abortion might become so hedged in by bureaucratic regulations that
it would be difficult to exercise the right.""
In 1985, Harvard Law Professor Laurence Tribe mused on what he called
"the always difficult problem of abortion." He wondered if the "somewhat
obscure 'privacy' rationale" of Roe v. Wade and its "rank[ing] the rights of
the mother categorically over those of the fetus" did not perhaps mean that the
Court "forsook a more cautious sensitivity to the mutual helplessness of the
mother and the unborn that could have accented the need for affirmative
legislative action to moderate the clash between the two."42 These
speculations about an obscure, contested, and sometimes unavailable right
which provably cannot claim public entitlement suggest that legal scholars
understood well before the Webster 43 decision that open season had begun
on women's so-called constitutional right to abortion.
For example, Tribe's view of "the mother and the unborn" as natural
antagonists is one that feminist analysis is now identifying with increasing
concern in legislation and litigation. Professor Janice Raymond of the
University of Massachusetts cites recent evidence that "abortion rights for
women are seriously undermined by the increasing prominence of the fetus and
sperm donor in the new reproductive technology scenario."" Women, she
38. Id. at 901.
39. Id. at 902.
40. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, Privacy v. Equality: Beyond Roe v. Wade (1983), in FEMINISM
UNMODIFIED 93, 100 (1987).
41. Osborne, supra note 27. This 1985 newspaper article reports Emerson's general belief that "there
is some danger that the rights of women will be chipped away." Id. His implication that women have rights
to lose seems incongruent with the prior defeat of the amendment that he had argued was necessary to
secure women's constitutional rights. The experts' vague threats on this essential point foster an irrational
legal environment for women's interests.
42. Laurence H. Tribe, The Abortion Funding Conundrum: Inalienable Rights, Affirmative Duties,
and the Dilemma of Dependence, 99 HARV. L. REV. 330, 342 (1985) (emphasis in original).
43. Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
44. Janice Raymond, The Chilling of Reproductive Choice, 14 ON THE ISSUES 7, 9 (1990). In
reviewing several cases, Raymond points out that, under the banner of sex equality, the rights of fathers
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says, should "start questioning the slippery slope [argument] which claims that
to oppose new reproductive technologies is to endanger women's right to
abortion. 41
C. The Privacy Right to Choose Pornography
Laws governing pregnancy have traditionally served to enforce the public
and private subordination of women to men's authority.' The regulatory
control of abortion established by Roe v. Wade in the name of privacy is
consistent with this tradition. Equally traditional is the visual metaphor for this
subordination-pornography representing pregnant women as sex in
bondage.47 It is not surprising, therefore, that it occurred to Harvard Law
Professor Alan Dershowitz that abortion could be held legally hostage for
pornography.
Commenting in 1984 on the Indianapolis anti-pornography ordinance,
in a syndicated magazine column on law, Dershowitz said:
[T]he issue is one of choice and freedom-much like the debate over
abortion. On one side of the scale are practices that some regard as
immoral and dangerous (pornography and abortion). On the other side
is the right of individuals to choose to engage in such practices. No one
would deny either side the right to try to persuade the other that its
actions are terrible. The real question is whether we are willing to give
one side the prohibitory power of the government to enforce its views
against the other.49
are articulated to prevent abortion, a tactic that strengthens the link between the rights of sperm donors
and the rights of fetuses. She argues that "technologies such as IVF [in vitro fertilization], embryo transfer,
and embryo freezing are extremely invasive to women's bodily integrity... [and] focus medical, legal,
and media attention on the status and rights of fetuses and men while rendering the.status and rights of
women at best incidental and at worst invisible." Id. at 7.
45. Id.
46. See ANDREA DWORKIN, INTERCOURSE 147-167 (1987). Dworkin examines the wider context of
this tradition in her historical and cultural analysis of laws regulating sexual intercourse. "Society justifies
its civil subordination of women by virtue of what it articulates as the 'natural' roles of men and women
in intercourse; the 'natural' subjugation of women to men in the act." Id. at 149. Specifying that
intercourse is subject to extensive regulation, Dworkin says that it cannot be private in the usual sense of
privacy as "a sphere of freedom immune from regulation by the state." Id. at 147. Yet, she says, "[tihe
state can manage a sudden and sensitive respect for privacy when it functions as a prison cell for . . . any
civilly inferior person .... Privacy in sex means that a man has a right to shield himself from state scrutiny
when sexually using civil inferiors." Id. at 148.
47. See ANDREA DWORKIN, PORNOGRAPHY: MEN POSSESSING WOMEN 218 (1989). Compare
Dworkin's description of bondage iconography of pregnancy pornography, id., with nude photographs of
a pregnant actress in Vanity Fair magazine. Nancy Collins, Demi's Big Moment, VANITY FAIR, Aug. 1991
(cover story, at 96); see also W. Speers, A Nude Pose of Pregnant Demi Moore, PHILA. INQUIRER, July
11, 1991, at 2C.
48. INDIANAPOLIS AND MARION COUNTY, IND., CrrY-CouNTY GEN. ORDINANCE No. 24 (Apr. 3,
1984) (amending Human Relations and Equal Opportunity Law, INDIANAPOLIS AND MARION COUNTY,
IND., CODE, Ch. 16 (1984)).
49. Alan Dershowitz, Feminist Fig Leaves, THIS WORLD, July 8, 1984, at 19 (United Feature
Syndicate). (Dershowitz published a similar commentary titled Foolish Fig Leaves in his law column in
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It appears that by becoming gatekeepers to women's pregnancy rights, civil
libertarians also become gatekeepers to women's right to a legal defense
against harm inflicted by pornography. The more vigorously the "right of
privacy" is defended for abortion, the more it legitimizes other "privacy
rights" such as unlimited access to pornography, wife battering, and other
behavior characterized, however harmful to women, as "sexual" and therefore
as "private."
But who is the "we" Dershowitz refers to as making decisions about
applying the prohibitory power of government? Certainly not women, who
have no claim to the constitutional protection of the First Amendment when
they are harmed as womenNo
Having made his argument, Dershowitz springs his gotcha: "In the abortion
debate, most feminists insist on the right to choose. In the current debate over
the Indianapolis statute, some feminists would deny that right to those who
choose pornography."" Thus, any limitation on pornography could cause the
loss of women's constitutional right to abortion and feminists would be to
blame. This causal linkage is logic, we are to understand, not retaliation.5"
Penthouse, a pornography magazine. PENTHOUSE. Feb. 1985, at 28.)
50. In a Supreme Court brief, advocates for legal recognition of the harm that pornography inflicts
on women described the findings of the two lower courts:
Neither court disagreed with the legislative judgment that these harms are based on sex or
questioned the conceptualization of these acts as practices of sex discrimination. The only issue
has been whether this harm of sex discrimination matters under the Constitution.
The legislative record shows that the pornography industry produces verbal and visual sexual
entertainment made from coercion, rape, extortion, exploitation, intimidation, fraud and unequal
opportunities .. .Pornography, as defined, and when coerced, forced on individuals, the cause
of assault, or actively trafficked, is inseparable from aggression and terror, crimes, torts, and
unspeakable indignities. Although men are also victimized and also covered, women and children
are its primary targets and victims.
Having accepted this reality, each court ruled that stopping this injustice is not as important
to the Constitution as inflicting it.
Jurisdictional Statement at 10, Hudnut v. American Booksellers Ass'n., 475 U.S. 1001 (1986) (No. 85-
1090).
Moreover, when Playboy (a pornography magazine), the American Library Association, the American
Booksellers Association, and the Magazine Publishers Association can sue to suppress factual testimony
presented in a federal hearing on pornography, win, and have their censorship viewed as a victory for
freedom of speech, there does not seem to be a "real question" any more about which side has already
been willingly given "the prohibitory power of the government to enforce its views against the other."
Dershowitz, supra note 46. A list of companies was described as "distributors of pornography" in testimony
by Donald Wildmon, testifying before the Attorney General's Commission on Pornography in 1985. Nancy
Lewis, Pornography Panel Ordered to Rescind 'Blacklist'Letter, WASH. POST, July 4, 1986, at Al, A28.
When the Commission staff later sent letters to the companies named, asking if they wished to respond
for the record, the Commission was sued by the above organizations to prevent publication of the list. By
federal court order, the Commission "was barred from including the 'blacklist' of companies in its report."
Id. at Al.
51. Dershowitz, supra note 46.
52. At the New York City hearing of the Attorney General's Commission on Pornography in 1986,
pro-pornography women picketers waved signs begging, "Don't take away our right to choose." (Author's
personal experience.) In the hearing room, representing Penthouse magazine and with a former Penthouse
Pet at his side, Alan Dershowitz testified as follows:
I am not sitting here telling you what my views on pornography are. I am not going to demean
myself... by telling you I am for or against it any more than I would tell a hearing on abortion
whether I was for abortion or against it. I am for choice.
Let me add one personal word. It is a disgrace to the memory of Roe versus Wade whose
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By this quid pro quo, Dershowitz makes it entirely clear that a legal right to
privacy for women which is contingent on men's right to use pornography-to
violate women's privacy as an act of power-is not a right at all but a gotcha.
Such manipulation of women's right to abortion demonstrates what
Emerson and his co-authors called "the large role which generalized belief in
the inferiority of women plays in the present scheme of subordination. I
fully agree with these authors that no "plan for eliminating sex discrimination"
can hope to succeed without directly attacking this belief in women's inferiority
and every institution that supports it. I would argue that men's perception of
pregnancy as pornography-that is, the objectification and sexually explicit
subordination of women-creates a link between liberal men's cooperation with
conservative men in maintaining legal control over abortion and their
cooperation in legally protecting pornography through obscenity law.
D. Abortion-Rights Liberals Agree With Anti-Abortion Conservatives:
Let The Debate Continue
With the concept of women's bodily integrity reduced to a demand that
women trade full acceptance of pornography for limited access to abortion,
the 1989 U.S. Supreme Court decision in Webster v. Reproductive Health
Services 4 came as no surprise. The decision reconfirmed the inherent
instability of the constitutional right to privacy when applied to women as a
class of persons whose constitutional right to equal protection of the law has
repeatedly been denied. 5
The journalistic frenzy anticipating the Webster decision 6 and the
legislative and electoral furor 7 following it show how heavily men rely on
pregnancy as a prime opportunity for harassing and controlling women. Armies
13th anniversary we celebrate today and which celebrates choice by women as to how to deal
with their bodies[,J that so many women purported [sic] to speak for the feminist movement,
which they do not speak for, came into this Commission today and urged this Commission on
the 13th anniversary of Roe versus Wade to cut back on freedom of choice as to what women
and men shall be able to do with their minds, their eyes, their ears, and their bodies.
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMM'N ON PORNOGRAPHY, TRANscRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS 291 (Jan. 22, 1986).
53. Brown et al., supra note 2, at 883.
54. 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
55. Historically this denial has been made three times: first, by the framers of the Constitution as
expressed by John Adams, see text accompanying note 21 supra; second, in the Fourteenth Amendment's
penalty for a state that denies voting rights to any of its "male citizens" who are of voting age, U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 2 (implication that women are denied equal protection guaranteed by Fourteenth
Amendment was ratified by exclusion of sex from voting rights guaranteed by Fifteenth Amendment), see
KATHLEEN BARRY, SUSAN B. ANTHONY: A BIOGRAPHY OF A SINGULAR FEMINIST 164, 189-90, 231-34,
249-53 (1988); and finally by state legislators through refusal to ratify the ERA by June 30, 1982, see
William E. Farrell, U.S. Amendment on Equal Rights Beaten in House, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 1983, at
Al.
56. Justice Blackmun Says Roe v. Wade Might Be Reversed During '88 Term, WASH. POST, Sept.
14, 1988, at A3; Al Kamen, Lawyers Expect High Court To Narrow Abortion Right, WASH. POST, Feb.
28, 1989, at A 1, AS. (Significantly, the continuation on page A5 is headlined Court Expected To Chip Away
On Abortion.)
57. Dan Balz, Battle OverAbortion Proceeds on Several Fronts, WASH. POST, Mar. 22, 1990, at A24.
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of legal scholars, politicians, and pundits are pouring through the gap in
federal boundaries hacked by Webster and rushing into the states with the keen
excitement of a gang attack in which men test themselves against each other
in pursuit of a common enemy. The battle cries are "life" and "choice." The
rhetoric on both sides is pornographic in its invasion of women's privacy, but
to speak of abortion laws as inherently sex discriminatory"s is still treason
against ERA orthodoxy.
When a constitutional right, such as women's right to vote, is clearly
acknowledged, there is little argument about exercising it. In an interview at
a Capitol Hill abortion-rights gala featuring a screening of the film The
Handmaid's Tale, 9 U.S. Senator Chuck Robb indicated the role of Roe v.
Wade in the suppression of women's right to equal protection of the law. Robb
said: "I think you will see an ebb and flow between those on both sides of the
[abortion] issue ... But I don't think it's ever going to be resolved."' Robb
is right. As long as women allow abortion to remain legally a "unique problem
for women," abortion rights will not be resolved. To participate on either side
of the debate on the present terms is to be a party to sexual harassment of
women and denial of their right to bodily integrity.
What is needed is to identify abortion laws-laws that treat abortion
differently from other standard medical procedures, including laws codifying
Roe v. Wade 6t-as discrimination on the basis of pregnancy and therefore as
sex discrimination, thus directly confronting the question of how the United
States Constitution must respond when women are discriminated against as
women.
And finally, it is necessary to re-direct public discussion to the source of
both the pregnancies and the discrimination. Why, for example, doesn't "safe
sex" mean condoms for contraception? Why, in fact, was "condom" a dirty
word until it occurred to the Surgeon General that a heterosexual man could
die of AIDS?62 And why, in a country where use of a product is normalized
58. In Planned Parenthood v. Casey, No. 90-1662, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 24792 (3d Cir. Oct. 21,
1991), the Third Circuit accepted Associate Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's "undue burden" standard as
"the law of the land" in upholding most provisions of the severely restrictive Pennsylvania Abortion Control
Act, 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 3201-3220 (1983 & Supp. 1991). The standard identifies abortion as
a "limited fundamental right" and allows regulations which "may inhibit abortions to some degree." Such
an argument demonstrates that the scope for jurisprudential gimmickry is boundless when equal protection
is not at issue. Kathryn Kolbert, an attorney for the American Civil Liberties Union's Reproductive Rights
Project who represented the plaintiff Planned Parenthood, said the decision effectively overturned Roe v.
Wade and might be appealed to the Supreme Court, but she did not indicate what the constitutional basis
for the appeal would be. See Michael D. Hinds, Appeals Court Upholds Limits forAbortions, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 22, 1991, at Al, A16.
59. THE HANDMAID'S TALE (Cinecom Entertainment Group 1990) depicts an Orwellian view of a
right-wing takeover of women.
60. Roxanne Roberts, At the Screening, a Political Message, WASH. PosT, Mar. 9, 1990, at D2.
61. Codification of the Roe v. Wade decision to establish a legal right to abortion was enacted in 1990
in Connecticut and has been proposed in other states. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19a-602 (1990); National
Abortion Rights Action League (NARAL), (Potential) Abortion Related Ballot Measures: 1992 Electoral
Cycle (Oct. 1991) (on file with the Yale Journal of Law and Feminism).
62. For some years, an "epidemic" of teen pregnancy has evoked journalistic handwringing and slyly
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by advertising, are condom advertisements banned by network television and
major newspapers-without objection from organizations which claim to be
for women's reproductive rights and against censorship? Moreover, why were
manly upper arms not chosen as the appropriate site for implanting "six
matchstick-sized [contraceptive] capsules"?6 Lastly, as a modest and not
entirely frivolous proposal, why not reframe the abortion issue as a crisis of
men's uncontrolled fertility which only the most severely restrictive measures
can resolve? Such an approach could cut off the abortion debate right now.
pornographic illustrations showing girl children with guilty expressions and big bellies. Although as Surgeon
General, Dr. C. Everett Koop opposed abortion and never advocated pregnancy-prevention education in
schools, his anti-AIDS campaign not only pushed sex education and condom use to prevent disease but
also saw abortion as a "possibility" to be tactfully mentioned to a pregnant AIDS victim. See Surgeon
General Urges AIDS Testing Prior to Pregnancy, THE PATRIOT (Harrisburg, Pa.), Mar. 25, 1987, at A5.
63. Malcolm Gladwell, Science Confronts Ethics in Contraceptive Implant, WASH. POST, Oct. 31,
1990, at A1, A14.
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